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The PJC Takes Another Hit
Posted 2/18/08 John T. Wilson IV and David E. Keltner, Kelly Hart & HallmanFord Motor Co. v. Ledesma,—S.W.3d --, 2007 WL 4465732 (Tex. Dec. 21, 2007).
Justice Willett, writing for an undivided Court, disapproved of the Texas Pattern Jury Charge’s definition of “producing cause”. Ledesma, an Austin motorist, lost control of his Ford F-350 dually pick-up while turning a corner, resulting in a collision with 2 cars parked at the curb. At the time of the accident, Ledesma’s truck had 4,100 miles on the odometer. Ledesma sued Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer of the truck, claiming that a manufacturing defect was the cause of the accident. A Bastrop County jury sided 11-1 with Ledesma and awarded him economic damages of $215,380. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Ford Motor Company’s Petition for Review, and reversed on two charge definitions: the definitions of manufacturing defect and producing cause.*
Both of the trial court’s submitted definitions had come from the Pattern Jury Charges, yet the Court found them flawed. With respect to the definition of manufacturing defect, the Court found that the PJC’s definition failed to account for the “deviation from specifications or planned output” requirement as established a decade ago in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997). The Court explained that the deviation requirement “serves the essential purpose of distinguishing a manufacturing defect from a design defect.” Ledesma, at *7. Moreover, because Texas law does not generally recognize a product failure or malfunction, standing alone, as sufficient proof of a product defect, a manufacturing deviation from the product’s design must be shown as a prerequisite to liability for a manufacturing defect.
The Court then turned to the trial court¡¦s definition of producing cause, submitted pursuant to PJC 70.1: “‘Producing cause’ means an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the incident in question. There may be more than one producing cause.” The Court found that while it had seemingly sanctioned the definition in prior decisions, “[t]o say that a producing cause is ‘an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natural sequence, produces the incident in question’ is incomplete and, more importantly, provides little concrete guidance to the jury.” Ledesma, at *7. The Court therefore disapproved the PJC 70.1 definition.
The Court provides guidance with respect to submitting proper definitions for both “manufacturing defect” and “producing cause.” The Court noted that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability ¡± 2(a) (1998) properly provides that “a product ‘contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product.’” Ledesma, at *7. With respect to producing cause, the Court approved producing cause language previously used in Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Bleeker, 966 S.W.32d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991): a producing cause is “one ‘that is a substantial factor that brings about injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.’” Ledesma, at *10.
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*The Court’s opinion also discusses the reliability of the expert testimony offered by Ledesma; however, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial court did not err with respect to the admissibility of the challenged expert opinions.